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NEW YORK'S OPEN MEETINGS LAW: REVISION OF
THE POLITICAL CAUCUS EXEMPTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT t
Timothy P. Whelan*
INTRODUCTION
The New York State Open Meetings Law' ("OML") is an
attempt to "shed a little sunshine" on the activities of state
and local governmental bodies. It implements the oft-cited and
weU-accepted principle that the public business of public bodies
normally should be conducted at public meetings. The OML's
Declaration of Legislative Policy emphasizes that in order to
maintain democracy citizens must be "fully aware of and able
to observe the performance of public officials and attend and
listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the mak-
ing of public policy."2
Since its adoption in 1976, courts have given the OML a
"broad and liberal construction so as to achieve the purposes
for which it was enacted."3 Two recent New York State court
decisions, however, raise serious questions about the proper
t Portions of this Article originally appeared in the New York Law Journal on
August 31, 1994.
* J.D., 1989, New York Law School; B.A., 1986, Rutgers University. The
author currently serves as General Counsel of the New York City Department of
Youth Services. Previously, he was a legislative attorney with the New York City
Council, serving as Counsel of the Committees on Finance, State and Federal
Legislation and Youth Services.
I N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 100-111 (McKinney 1988).
2 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100. When New York enacted the OML in 1976, it
became the last state to codify this commitment to open government. Ch. 511, §
90 [1976] N.Y. LAWS 1. Since Alabama first adopted its "sunshine" law in 1915,
similar laws "have been enacted to expose and lay bare the decision-making pro-
cess of governmental bodies" to address the "[plervasive tendency for our public
officials to attempt to function in secrecy." Orange County Publications v. Council
of Newburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409, 418, 401 N.Y.S.2d 84, 91 (2d Dep't), affd, 45 N.Y.2d
947, 383 N.E.2d 1157, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1978).
2 Holden v. Board of Trustees, 80 A.D.2d 378, 381, 440 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (3d
Dep't 1981).
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scope of the judiciary's exercise of statutory interpretation and
its fidelity to the express legislative intent underlying the
OML. These decisions manifest a frustration with the unequiv-
ocal expansiveness of the OML's political caucus exemption
and its application to local governments, by carving out excep-
tions to the OML that lack any statutory basis. Further, the
motivation for and substance of recent proposed statutory
amendments that focus exclusively on local governments must
be seriously questioned for their disregard of the principle and
tradition of municipal home rule in New York.
This Article considers the historical purpose, application
and treatment of the political caucus exemption to New York's
OML. Part I examines the legislative history and judicial treat-
ment of the exemption to the OML, as well as its use by the
State Legislature. Part II considers the recent New York deci-
sions that have restricted the scope of the exemption as it
applies to local government bodies. Part III analyzes the
decisions' implications for local government and criticizes the
imposition of restrictive conditions on the statutory
exemption's broad applicability. Part IV reviews recent statuto-
ry proposals that would limit the political caucus exemption
and Part V critiques the proposed amendments that would
target local governments exclusively within the context of mu-
nicipal home rule. The Article concludes by suggesting a redi-
rection of effort by advocates of reform, while noting that
legitimate public policy reasons exist that should give pause to
such efforts.
I. THE POLITICAL CAUCUS EXEMPTION
While the OML presumes that "[e]very meeting of a public
body shall be open to the general public,"4 it contains excep-
tions recognizing that a public body should be permitted to ad-
dress certain topics in private, to allow for unfettered discus-
sion outside the glare of public scrutiny. Section 105 delineates
the limited reasons for which a public body can hold a closed
executive session. These include protecting public safety, crim-
inal investigations, legislative or collective bargaining negotia-
tions, personnel matters and property transactions. 5 Courts
4 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 103(a).
6 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 105. Section 105 authorizes executive sessions for
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have construed this provision strictly to prevent "the Article's
clear mandate [from] be[ing] thwarted."' Section 108, in turn,
carves out three exemptions to the "open meeting" presump-
tion. This section renders the law inapplicable to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, except proceedings of the public
service commission and zoning boards of appeals; deliberations
of political committees, conferences and caucuses; and any
matter made confidential by federal or state law.7
Although both sections 105 and 108 permit closed meet-
ings, they apply to different types of meetings. An executive
session may be convened only upon a motion made in an open
meeting, identifying with particularity the subject matter to be
discussed in executive session.8 Upon the termination of such
discussion, if other matters are addressed, the public body is
obliged to reconvene in open session. Section 106(2) requires
that minutes be kept at executive sessions of any action that is
taken by a formal vote.9 In contrast, the meetings covered by
section 108 are not "meetings" at all under the OML and are
not limited to particular subjects. ° Public notice provisions do
discussions of the following subjects:
(a) matters which will imperil the public safety if disclosed;
(b) any matter which may disclose the identity of a law enforce-
ment agent or informer;
(c) information regarding any current or future investigation or
prosecution of a criminal offense which would imperil public safety if
disclosed;
(d) discussions regarding proposed, pending or current litigation;
(e) collective bargaining negotiations pursuant to article 14 of the
civil service law;
(f) the medical, financial, credit or employment history of an indi-
vidual or entity, as well as various personnel matters;
(g) the preparation, grading or administration of exams; and
Ch) proposed real property or securities transactions.
Id.
Daily Gazette Co. v. Town Bd., 111 Misc. 2d 303, 304, 444 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46
(Sup. Ct. Schoharie County 1981) (declaring invalid a town board executive session
over enforcement of zoning ordinances for failure to identify specifically the pro-
posed litigation to be discussed). "In order to be validly convened there must be
strict adherence to the procedure [of § 105] .... [The] boilerplate recitation [of a
statutorily prescribed purpose for an executive session] does not comply with the
intent of the statute." Id.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108.
Daily Gazette, 111 Misc. 2d at 304, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
' N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 106(2).
10 Orange County Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 45 N.Y.2d 947, 949,
383 NM.2d 1157, 1157, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564, 564 (1978). The Court of Appeals ad-
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not apply, records or minutes need not be kept and formal
procedures are not required to convene such an assemblage. If
a meeting by definition falls into one of the three prescribed
categories, it is outside the OML's scope."
The second class of meetings identified in section 108,
collectively known as "the political caucus exemption,"12 has
had a provocative statutory and judicial history: the manner in
which it has been employed by state and local governmental
bodies has been the subject of much contention. As originally
enacted in 1976, section 108 simply provided that the OML
would not apply to "deliberations of political committees, con-
ferences and caucuses."" The failure to define these terms
was criticized immediately. A 1977 law review article noted
that these were "general categories... susceptible to an
overbroad construction"'4 and proposed that the exemption be
"judicially narrowed to apply only to the internal affairs of
political parties... [tlo further the legislative purpose behind
the open meetings law," and close a "sizable" and "wholly un-
warranted" loophole. 5 The courts followed this thinking and
dressed the Open Meetings Law ("OML") for the first time and held, in part, that
the determination of whether a meeting of a public body was subject to the OML
did not turn upon whether a formal vote was taken. In response, the State Legis-
lature changed the statutory definition of "meeting" from "the formal convening of
a public body for the purpose of officially transacting public business" to "the offi-
cial convening of a public body for the purpose of conducting public business," ch.
704, § 1 [1979] N.Y. LAWS 1361 (emphasis added), in order to encompass the
broader definition of activities that would bring a meeting within the scope of the
OML.
n N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108.
'Id.
's N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 103(2) (amended as Ch. 136, § 2 [1985] N.Y. LAWS
462 (McKinney), recodified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108(2)).
" William A. Brewer, 11 & Alex Smith, Comment, New York Open Meetings
Law: A Critical Evaluation, 41 ALB. L. REV. 329, 355 (1977). In 1977, the year in
which the OML became effective, a "deluge of complaints" already had been regis-
tered regarding the vagueness and ambiguity of the statute. In response, the au-
thors provided a comprehensive critical analysis of its provisions and proposed
various legislative amendments "to improve the structure of the law." Id. at 330.
The statutory changes enacted during the past 17 years have had mixed results.
They have widened certain loopholes and effectively diminishing public access to
governmental deliberations while ensuring that a broad definition of a "public
meeting" is applied to maximize the number of gatherings within the OML's scope.
See supra note 5.
" Brewer & Smith, supra note 14, at 355. The authors proposed a restrictive
judicial interpretation in order to "prevent a quorum of a public body made up of
members of the same political party from meeting to discuss public, non-party af-
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consistently interpreted the exemption to encompass only those
closed meetings convened to discuss "the private matters of a
political party, as opposed to matters which are public business
yet discussed by political party members." 6 The political cau-
cus exemption was deemed "inapplicable to closed session
meetings of the majority political party to discuss matters of
public business."'
17
In an important 1981 decision, Sciolino v. Ryan," the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that the closed
meetings of the eight Democratic Party members of the nine-
member Rochester City Council violated the OML. The Demo-
cratic members had met regularly in private with the mayor of
Rochester to discuss governmental matters likely to come be-
fore the Council. In affirming the lower court decision, the
Fourth Department cautioned that "[an expansive definition of
a political caucus... would defeat the purpose of the Open
Meetings Law that public business be performed in an open
and public manner... [because] such a definition could apply
to exempt regular meetings of the Council." The court
opined that in order "[tio assure that the purpose of the statute
is realized, the exemption for political caucuses should be nar-
fairs." Id.
6 Sciolino v. Ryan, 81 A!D.2d 475, 479, -440 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (4th Dep't
1981).
17 Britt v. County of Niagara, 82 A.D.2d 65, 68, 440 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (4th
Dep't 1981). In Britt, the court found that meetings of a county legislature's Demo-
cratic majority to discuss a reapportionment plan did not violate the OML because
a quorum of the legislature was not present. Although the majority based its deci-
sion on the lack of a quorum, which is required for a meeting to fall within the
scope of the OML, it cited Sciolino to deny the applicability of the caucus exemp-
tion where matters of public business are discussed. Id. at 68, 440 N.Y.S.2d at
793. The concurring opinion, however, de-emphasized the issue of a quorum and
found instead that the meetings in question were exempt from the OIL as "parti-
san political caucuses." Id. at 71, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (concurring judgment). The
concurrence further found that the legislature's intent to exclude such meetings
from the OML was evidenced by: (i) the express exemption in the Public Officers
Law; and (ii) the failure of the legislature to amend or modify that exemption
after the decision of the Third Department in Daily Gazette Co. v. North Colonie
Bd. of Educ., 67 A.D.2d 803, 412 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1979), which held that board's
standing committees did not come within the definition of a "public body" subject
to the OML. Id. at 71, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
'8 81 A.D.2d 475, 440 N.Y.S.2d 795 (4th Dep't 1981).
" Id. at 479, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The court, noting that "the term 'political
caucus' is not defined by the statute," formulated its own definition, consistent
with the OML's intent. Id.
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rowly, not expansively, construed."2
The Sciolino court focused on two elements. First, a quo-
rum of the Council had been present at the meeting. Second,
the subject matter addressed at the meeting concerned items
before the Council that affected the public and "directly re-
late[d] to the possibility of a municipal matter becoming an
official enactment."21 The court warned that to characterize a
meeting containing these two elements as a meeting of a "ma-
jority" of a political party rather than a "quorum" of a public
body would "allow[ I the public to be aware of only legislative
results, not deliberations, violating the spirit of the [OML] and
exalting form over substance."22
Sciolino played a critical role in the evolution of the politi-
cal caucus exemption by applying a narrow judicial interpreta-
tion to the exemption's scope. The court juxtaposed the statuto-
ry exemption with the overriding intent of the OML: to pro-
mote "the performance of public business in an open and public
manner, with the public able to attend and listen to the delib-
erations and decisions that go into the making of public poli-
cy. "22 In the absence of a statutory definition of "political cau-
cus," the court inferred from the brevity of the exemption that
the legislature had intended "to prevent the statute from ex-
tending to the private matters of a political party, as opposed
to matters which are public business yet discussed by political
party members."24
Sciolino was cited with approval in a 1985 opinion of the
Committee on Open Government.' The Committee's opinion,
though advisory, was significant because, unlike previous opin-
ions that had addressed political caucuses in the context of
local public bodies, this opinion applied to caucus meetings of
20 Id.
21 Id. at 478, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
2 Id.
' Sciolino, 81 A.D.2d at 477, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
24 Id. at 479, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
' Letter from Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director, New York State Com-
mittee on Open Government, to Frederic Dicker, Albany Bureau Chief, New York
Post 4 (Apr. 11, 1985) (Informal Advisory Opinion No. 1158) [hereinafter Freeman
Letter]. Section 109 of the Public Officers Law authorizes the Committee on Open
Government to "issue advisory opinions from time to time as, in its discretion,
may be required to inform public bodies and persons of the interpretations of the
provisions of the open meetings law." N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 109.
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the New York State Assembly and Senate. Consistent with
Sciolino, the Committee on Open Government concluded that
when a caucus attended by a quorum of either house was held
to discuss public business, as opposed to political party affairs,
the OMI, would apply.26
According to one commentator, the advisory opinion served
as the catalyst for the 1985 statutory revision of section 108.27
Given the extent to which the respective majority parties in
the Senate (Republican) and Assembly (Democrat) have con-
vened caucus meetings (known in Albany as "conferences") to
discuss the substantive and political merits of pending legisla-
tion it seems likely that the reforms were a reaction to the
Committee's opinion.
The practice of conferences continues and, indeed, they
occur almost daily during the legislative session. Closed meet-
ings of a voting majority in each house have become an inte-
gral part of the state legislative process. Bills approved by the
majority party in conference invariably are approved by that
particular house without the need for any public debate since
the conference's block of legislators can guarantee its passage.
Conversely, those legislative items that fail to win approval in
the caucus have virtually no chance of being placed on the leg-
islative agenda for a vote by the full legislative body. Only
rarely are bills released by the caucus for a discussion and vote
on the floor without predetermining its fate. One political ob-
server in Albany described the process in both houses as fol-
lows:
When the conference, always meeting in secret, makes a decision
26 Freeman Letter, supra note 25, at 8.
" Joseph Sluzar, New York Abandons a Commitment To Open Meetings, 50
ALB. L. REV. 613 (1986). "While the New York State Legislature did not react to
Sciolino or to other political caucus litigation, it reacted swiftly to the opinion of
the Committee on Open Government." Id. at 623.
An equally significant, if not greater, catalyst for the Legislature's 1985
Amendment was a lawsuit threatened at that time by the New York Post. Accord-
ing to Fred Dicker, the Post's veteran reporter in Albany, in 1985 he sought and
was denied access to the majority party conferences in both the Senate and As-
sembly. Subsequently, the New York Post formally notified the majority parties in
both houses that it intended to sue them for violating the OML based upon the
Committee on Open Government's advisory opinion. Within a few weeks, the Sen-
ate and Assembly summarily passed the amendment to section 108 overriding the
advisory opinion and Governor Cuomo signed it into law. Telephone Interview with
Fred Dicker, N.Y. Post (Aug. 25, 1994).
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about policy it is the usual rule that everyone "goes along" unless
allowed to deviate for some very good reason, and that has been
cleared in advance with the leader. If allowed to deviate they are
"off the hook." If they are required to take the pain and do what
they are told, they are "in the tank.""5
Because caucuses are not deemed "meetings of a public body"
under the OML, no notice of their scheduling, no list of agenda
items and no record of final decisions are required to be provid-
ed to the public.
Although they are closed meetings, conferences in Albany
are hardly clandestine. Party leaders in the State Legislature
regularly announce their conference meetings and the fate of
bills that have been considered in these closed sessions. In the
1994 legislative session, for example, legislators acknowledged
that several noteworthy bills failed to be reported out of party
conference and, therefore, would not be considered for a vote.
Included among these proposals were bills banning assault
weapons and imposing increased penalties for bias-related
crimes-both rejected in the Senate Republican confer-
ence-and a bill that failed to win approval in the Assembly
Democratic conference that would have required doctors to
notify parents of the results of HIV tests on newborns.29
The reliance of the majority parties in both houses on
caucus meetings to determine their legislative agendas is
plain. Not surprisingly, when the combination of the Sciolino
decision and the Committee on Open Government's 1985 advi-
sory committee opinion threatened the continued availability of
Alan Chartock, There Are Times To Say Yes, Times To Say No, LEGISLATIVE
GAZETTE, May 31, 1994, at 15.
For example, the New York Times reported on July 1, 1994 that:
For the second year in a row, the Republican majority in the Senate
killed a bill that would guarantee civil rights protection to homosexuals.
As last year, when the bill was first passed by the Democratic-controlled
Assembly, the Senate Republicans decided during a closed-door meeting
tonight that the gay rights bill would not be sent to the floor for a vote.
Ian Fischer, Bill Compels Care for Mentally 1l, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1994, at B4.
A few days earlier, the New York Times had reported that "[aifter a closed
door session of Assembly Democrats tonight, where nearly 40 members spoke
about the bill," the Assembly Speaker announced the rejection of the bill providing
for mandatory parental notification of HIV test results for newborns and endorsed
an alternative bill that would have mandated counseling of pregnant women and
new mothers about the benefits of the early diagnosis of EIV. Kevin Sack, Com-
promise is Proposed on H.I.V. Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at B1.
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caucus meetings for such purposes, the State Legislature react-
ed by protecting its institutional and political interests.
The Legislature made clear in the 1985 Amendment its
intent to include within the political caucus exemption discus-
sion of public matters by legislative bodies, including local
governments, and caucuses that consist of a quorum of a legis-
lative body. Its declaration of legislative intent acknowledged
that the political caucus exemption supports the political party
system in legislative bodies by allowing members to engage in
"the private, candid exchange of ideas and points of view...
concerning the public business" that comes before the body."
Meetings were perceived as thereby enhancing the function of
parties as "mediating institutions between disparate interest
groups and government... [which] promote continuity, sta-
bility and orderliness in government.""' The declaration of
legislative intent also noted that recent judicial decisions had
eroded the exemption by limiting its application to discussions
of political business." The declaration of intent then pro-
claimed the Legislature's "adherence to the original intent""
of the political caucus exemption and set forth the substantive
changes in the law. The most significant change was the
Legislature's assertion that the OML:
does not apply to the deliberations of political committees, conferenc-
es and caucuses of legislative bodies regardless of (i) the subject
matter under discussion, including discussions of public business,
(ii) the majority or minority status of such political committees, con-
ferences and caucuses 4
It is debatable whether the 1985 Amendment clarified the
original law's legislative intent or instead created a sweeping
restriction of public access to the workings of government. One
critic of the amendment asserted that it "presages an end to
New York's commitment to open meetings" and "vitiate[s] the
public's right to open government."35 In particular, the critic
noted the potential for abuse at local municipal levels, where
governments controlled by one party could use the expanded
:3 Ch. 136, § 1 [19851 N.Y. LAWS 462 (MciMey).
31 Id.
2Id.
"Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Sluzar, supra note 27, at 624, 625.
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coverage of the political caucus as a means for essentially con-
ducting all public business in private, thereby excluding not
only any minority party members but also the public "from
observing any meaningful discussion of public business."36
The validity of this criticism, which expresses the same prem-
ise as the Sciolino decision, was explicitly denied by the State
Legislature.
Shortly after the enactment of the 1985 Amendment, the
Third Department, in Oneonta Star v. County of Schoharie,
found the amended language dispositive. The case involved a
challenge to the closed caucus meetings of the ten-member
Republican Party majority on Schoharie County's sixteen-mem-
ber governing board. During these meetings, party members
had discussed matters scheduled for an upcoming vote. 7 The
court upheld the meetings by citing to the State Legislature's
declaration that "its intent in the enactment of prior legislation
was not to prohibit political caucuses from considering public
business to come before legislative bodies and exempting such
meetings from such law."' Since Oneonta Star, few cases
have challenged the political caucus exemption to the OML,
perhaps because its broad application appeared so explicitly
defined. Recently, however, two decisions, Humphrey v.
Posluszny39 and Buffalo News v. City of Buffalo Common
Council," came to conclusions at odds with the Third
Department's seemingly straightforward interpretation of the
1985 law. Taken together, these decisions evince a judicial at-
tempt to restrict the scope of the political caucus exemption
despite the Legislature's explicit determination to the contrary.
These cases represent a frustration with the perceived ineffica-
cy of the OML as a mechanism for ensuring adequate public
access to the deliberations of local government.
" Sluzar, supra note 27, at 627.
" Oneonta Star v. County of Schoharie, 112 A.D.2d 622, 492 N.Y.S.2d 145 (3d
Dept 1985).
38 Id. at 623, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 146. Further, the court denied the newspaper's
request for legal fees "[b]ecause the legislative enactment [1985 Amendment] is
intended to be a declaration of preexisting law." Id. at 623, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
3' 175 A!D.2d 587, 573 N.Y.S.2d 790 (4th Dept), appeal dismissed, 78 N.Y.2d
1072, 582 N.E.2d 605, 576 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1991).
" 154 Misc. 2d 400, 585 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1992).
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II. THE JUDICIARY OPENS THE CAUCUSES' DOORS
A. Humphrey v. Posluszny
In the first of these cases, Humphrey v. Posluszny, the
Fourth Department reversed a lower court opinion that had
found that closed meetings between Independent Party
members of the Lancaster Village Board, who constituted a
quorum, and members of the Village Police Benevolent Associ-
ation were protected by the political caucus exemption.41 In
1990, the Erie County Supreme Court dismissed an Article 78
petition brought by the minority party members of the Board.
The lower court relied on pre-1985 cases that had exempted
caucuses from the OML only if the agenda was limited to in-
ternal political business. According to the court, the 1985
Amendment "represents the Legislature's response to a series
of judicial decisions which had, in that body's collective judg-
ment, 'eroded' the political caucus exemption."42 While assum-
ing the facts presented in the light most favorable to the peti-
tioners, and conceding that public business was, and had con-
tinued to be, regularly discussed, the court found that "the
meetings of the majority of the Board under the aegis of the
Independent Party are clearly the deliberations of a political
caucus, and, as such, are exempt from the requirements of the
Open Meetings Law. No other conclusion comports with the
plain language of... Section 108(2)(a), (b), the clear intention
of the Legislature ... and the relevant case law.243
On appeal, the Fourth Department reversed in a 3-2 deci-
sion. The appellate court referred to the legislative intent of
the 1985 law, citing a portion of the Legislature's finding that
"the public interest was promoted by a 'private, candid ex-
change of ideas and points of view among members of each
political party concerning the public business to come before
legislative bodies."'44 According to the court, "[n]onetheless,
what occurred at the meeting at issue went beyond a candid
41 Humphrey, 175 A.D.2d at 588, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Humphrey v. Posluszny, 148 Misc. 2d 848, 849, 562 N.Y.S.2d 598, 598 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1990).
' Id. at 849, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (emphasis added).
4 175 AJ).2d at 588, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (quoting Ch. 136, § 1 [1985] N.Y.
LAWS 462 (McKinney)).
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discussion, permissible at an exempt caucus, and amounted to
the conduct of public business, in violation" of section 103(a) of
the OML.4" The court provided no further explanation for its
decision. Nor was the dissent illuminating. It merely stated
that the meeting fell within the exemption contained in section
108(2)(b).46
The appellate decision is at best puzzling. The Fourth
Department's characterization of what transpired in the closed
meetings as the "conduct of public business" 47 directly con-
flicts with the lower court's finding that "public business was,
and is regularly, discussed."4" Unfortunately, neither opinion
refers explicitly to the specific subject matter of the meeting.
The appellate court's failure to explain its differing interpreta-
tion of the meeting's subject matter leaves little room for dis-
cussion on the point. All that can be gleaned from this decision
is that the appellate court determined that the "conduct" of
public business in political caucuses is distinct from the "dis-
cussion" of public business and must be prohibited. For the
first time, a New York court carved out an exception within
the recently amended exemption, and distinguished the prohib-
ited act of conducting public business from permissive discus-
sion of such affairs. The distinction is vague at best and the
court failed to specify what prohibited conduct is.
Indeed, the intent of the OML was to open the delibera-
tions of public bodies to public scrutiny in order to reveal more
than simply the formal vote-taking or decision-making rite.49
As the Third Department recently noted, it is "the deliberative
process which is at the core of the [OML]." 5° The Fourth De-
partment in Humphrey failed to appreciate that the "delibera-
'- Id. at 588, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
' Id. at 589, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
I' Id. at 588, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Humphrey, 148 Misc. 2d at 849, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
See Orange County Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409, 414,
401 N.Y.S.2d 84, 89 (2d Dep't) ("We believe that the Legislature intended to in-
clude more than the mere formal act of voting or the formal execution of an offi-
cial document. Every step of the decision-making process, including the decision
itself, is a necessary preliminary to formal action .... It is the entire decision-
making process that the Legislature intended to affect by the enactment of this
statute."), affd, 45 N.Y.2d 947, 383 N.E.2d 1157, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1978).
" Goodson Todman Enters. v. City of Kingston, 153 AJD.2d 103, 105, 550
N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (3d Dep't 1990) (quoting Orange County, 60 AJD.2d at 414, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 88).
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tions" allowable in a political caucus encompass discussions of
public business that often culminate in consensus or resolu-
tion-for those in attendance, everything but an official vote.
Such activity was challenged in Sciolino and the Committee on
Open Government's advisory opinion, but was sanctioned ex-
plicitly by the 1985 Amendment. Though certainly a valid
subject for criticism, the State Legislature's action in 1985
expressly broadened the scope of the political caucus exemption
and should have resolved conclusively any previous ambigu-
ities.
B. Buffalo News v. City of Buffalo Common Council
The second judicially created exception to the political
caucus exemption was introduced in 1992 by the Supreme
Court in Erie County in Buffalo News v. City of Buffalo Com-
mon Council.51 This decision held that although the members
were all of the same political party, a closed meeting of a quo-
rum of the Buffalo Common Council violated the OML. The
members, who had convened for the purpose of discussing the
city's budget crisis, alleged that their meeting fell within the
political caucus exemption to the OML. Significantly, the en-
tire membership of the Common Council was comprised of one
political party. Once again, the concerns expressed in 1977 and
1986 were realized as a one-party controlled government body
abused the political caucus exemption." According to the
court, the one-party legislature had convened "to adopt in pri-
vate a proposed plan to address the deficit before 'going public'
to debate whether such a plan will be accepted."53 Petitioner,
The Buffalo News, had sought judicial intervention to invali-
date the closed meeting as violative of the OML and contrary
to the conventional applicability of the political caucus exemp-
tion. The Buffalo Common Council argued that the meeting fell
squarely within the scope of the exemption as it had been
clarified by the State Legislature in 1985.
The court rejected the Common Councils argument, noting
the danger that:
, 154 Misc. 2d 400, 585 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1992).
' See supra notes 14-18 & 34-36 and accompanying text.
Buffalo News, 154 Misc. 2d at 401, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
19951
BROOKLI LAW REVIEW
A literal reading of Section 108... could effectively preclude the
public from any participation whatsoever in a government which is
entirely controlled by one political party. Every public meeting deal-
ing with sensitive or controversial issues could be preceded by a
"political caucus" which would have no public input, and the public
meeting decisions on such issues would be a mere formality. Such
interpretation would negate the Legislature's declaration in Section
100.64
The court concluded that the legislature's amendment of the
political caucus exemption must be viewed within the context
of its preservation of the OML's declaration of legislative in-
tent in section 100. Thus, the court deemed it "necessary to
determine if section 108 can be reasonably interpreted consis-
tent with the declaration of section 100.""
The court distinguished the Third Department's 1985
Oneonta Star decision from its own decision in Humphrey
(which was later overturned). The critical distinction, according
to the Buffalo News court, was that in both prior decisions, the
political caucus exemption was addressed within the context of
a two- or multi-party public body on which at least one minor-
ity party member had served. The court suggested that "per-
haps.., it would be fair to assume that" a meeting unattend-
ed by a single member of an opposing political party may be
considered a political caucus only if the legislative body itself is
composed of representatives from more than one party. The
same could not be true when "the entire legislature is of one
party and the stated purpose is to adopt a proposed plan to
address the deficit before going public."56
The court cited no precedent to support its conclusions nor
did it refer to any statements evincing the Legislature's intent
to limit the scope of the 1985 Amendment. The court entered
the realm of the hypothetical by distinguishing between a
public body comprised of members entirely of one political
party and a public body with a ratio of perhaps 8:1, 34:1, or
100:1.
According to the court, a lone minority member changes
the entire political dynamic, transforming a private meeting of
Id. at 402-03, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
Id. at 403, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
' Id. at 403-04, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
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an overwhelming veto-proof majority of legislators, into one in
which the majority party will discuss "political posturing on
public issues."57 Such a distinction lacks any nexus with reali-
ty and elevates technical over substantive fidelity to the law.
From a public policy perspective, that lone minority party
member can offer no effective resistance to the overwhelming
tide of the majority. The impact the solitary opposing legislator
might have on law-making depends more on broader media
and public support for a particular municipal issue rather than
on ideologically grounded, partisan opposition (as would any
member of a public body regardless of party affiliation).
An equally improbable yet logical extension of Buffalo
News occurs with the election of a single minority party mem-
ber to a body comprised of a vast majority of opposition-party
local legislators. Although prohibited from calling a caucus
prior to the election, the majority delegation would now be free
to do so and exclude the lone minority party member, as well
as the press, advocates and other interested parties, from the
entire range of deliberative and decision-making activity. As
long as the sole minority party member is in office, the ma-
jority party could avail itself of an exclusive caucus. If in the
next election, however, the minority party member loses, the
exemption ends.
Such discontinuity results in institutional instability in
both the internal operations of the legislature and its relations
with the executive branch and other levels of government.
Furthermore, it raises the possibility that the controlling ma-
jority party may decide not to run a candidate in one race,
trading token minority party representation for the ability to
retain the use of the caucus exemption to prevent public and
media scrutiny. (A speculative but not unthinkable scenario in
the real world of local party politics).
That the existence of this lone minority party representa-
tive carried such weight with the court suggests that the court
stretched its logic extremely thin to reach a certain conclusion.
The tenuousness of the court's logic is illustrated by its refusal
"to declare open every possible meeting of the Buffalo Common
Council where the budget crisis may be discussed," claiming
"' Buffalo News, 154 Misc. 2d at 403, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
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that this would be "difficult if not impossible" to order." In-
stead, the court stated that with respect to single-party legis-
latures:
it must be left to the sound discretion of honorable and honest legis-
lators to clearly announce the intent and purpose of future meetings
and open the same accordingly consistent with the overall intent of
[the OML].A '
As with the judicially created "one-party legislature excep-
tion" to the political caucus exemption, this "one-party legisla-
ture honor system" cannot be found in the OML. In fact, as-
suming that the court's statutory analysis is valid, its finding
that the caucus exemption is facially inapplicable to single-
party legislatures, combined with the fact that budget discus-
sions are most certainly matters of public business, appears to
make an order prospectively opening all such meetings a
straightforward application of the law rather than a "difficult"
or "impossible" undertaking." Furthermore, if the court was
seeking to rewrite the exemption, the existence of a single
minority party representative is a weak basis for triggering the
caucus exemption. The court could have addressed its public
policy concerns better by setting the minority party numerical
threshold at a level that could prevent a majority party over-
ride of an executive veto. The court's concern that the political
caucus in a one-party public body would preclude public partic-
ipation applies equally to a political caucus convened by a
large number of majority-party members. In either situation,
the caucus can be used as a pretext for making an irreversible,
Id. at 404, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
69 Id.
" Section 107 of the OML provides for the enforcement of its provisions by an
Article 78 proceeding and/or an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 107 (McKinney 1988); see also Goodson Todman En-
ters. v. City of Kingston, 153 A.D.2d 103, 106, 550 N.Y.S.2d 157, 159 (3d Dep't
1990) (after finding several private meetings violative of the OML, the Third De-
partment rejected appellant's request to enjoin the Council from holding such se-
cret meetings in the future, but did so solely upon the basis that the record did
not support the "drastic remedy of injunctive relief); Sanna v. Lindenhurst Bd. of
Educ., 85 A.D.2d 157, 160, 447 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (2d Dep't 1982) (in rejecting
petitioner's claim to annul board's termination of her employment in an unlawful
closed session, the Second Department noted that "apart from a demand for an
attorney's fee authorized by the [OML], petitioner asks for no other relief that
might be more appropriate in view of the public nature of the wrong committed
by the board, such as an injunction against future procedural informalities").
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institutional decision on a matter of public policy while in
closed session, thereby rendering any ensuing public meeting
decision "a mere formality."
III. IMPLICATIONS OF HUMPHREY AND BUFFALO NEws
While Humphrey and Buffalo News are considered at-
tempts to promote "good government" and address public policy
concerns, they fail to consider the realities of local government
and institutional party politics. More significantly, the courts'
actions represent attempts to legislate, adding caveats and
conditions to the OML that the State Legislature both explicit-
ly and implicitly has rejected. When the legislature revisited
the political caucus exemption in 1985, it indeed may have, as
one commentator stated, "widened the exemptions granted to
political caucuses, and as a result, the exception . . . swal-
low[ed] the rule.""' Notwithstanding the arguable validity of
such criticism, both houses of the State Legislature (and the
Governor, who signed the 1985 Amendment into law) presum-
ably were aware that large party majorities (if not monopolies)
exist in local legislative bodies. The state, however, did nothing
to limit the political caucus exemption to address such local
"evils."
The judiciary's proper role in interpreting the OML was
articulated by the Court of Appeals several years prior to the
1985 Amendment. In 1978, the state's highest court empha-
sized the importance of deferring to legislative intent and de-
clared that it "is neither appropriate nor necessary to suggest
agreement with the legislative policy or to indorse it, a matter
exclusively for the Legislature in applying its views to the
legislative and executive branches of government." 2 Never-
theless, the courts in Humphrey and Buffalo News ignored the
plain meaning and intent of the 1985 Amendment and effec-
tively inserted their own revisions into the OML. In re-
sponding to perceived attempts by local governments to manip-
ulate the law to avoid public scrutiny, the courts clearly over-
stepped their bounds and inappropriately assumed the role of
Sluzar, supra note 27, at 635.
Orange County Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 45 N.Y.2d 947, 949,
383 N.E.2d 1157, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564, 564 (1978).
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the legislature. These revisions, while arguably beneficial to
the cause of greater access to government decision-making,
were promulgated by the wrong branch of government in seri-
ously flawed decisions.
63
The foregoing criticism of these two decisions is not offered
in support of the attempted manipulation of the OML's politi-
cal caucus exemption as a shield against public scrutiny of
local legislative bodies. Nor is it meant to justify the regular
use of the exemption by the majority parties in the State Sen-
ate and Assembly to determine the fate of pending legislative
items. The analyses contained in the 1977 and 1986 law review
articles detailing the potential, or as one commentator put it,
the "invitation,6 4 for abuse of the exemption by local legisla-
tures dominated overwhelmingly by one party remain
sound.65 In all likelihood, the public has been and continues
to be excluded from some of the discourse and deliberations of
its local boards and councils through their use of the political
caucus exemption.
Whether this is wholly inappropriate is less than certain.
The open meetings requirement can and does hamper a legis-
lature's efficacy as a counterweight to the local executive. The
requirement limits the legislature's ability to strategize on
important and complex matters and to allow its members to
speak openly and freely on sensitive institutional issues, such
as ongoing budget negotiations. Legislators may show some
self-restraint in using such caucuses and, indeed, the Demo-
cratic majority leadership of the New York City Council has
convened caucuses sparingly during the past several years. In
the months of May and June 1994, for example, the few cau-
cuses called during negotiations on the fiscal year 1995 budget
were supported by reasons such as the existence of a Repub-
lican Mayor, an expanded seven-member Republican minority
contingent, the charged tenor of the ongoing negotiations with
I In his 1986 article, Sluzar appears to recognize that any alteration of the
exemption to limit its applicability must be undertaken by the State Legislature.
Sluzar, supra note 27, at 614 ("[Changing the scope of the exemption] will be
accomplished only if the legislature is willing to modify its 1985 amendment."); id.
at 628 ("Open government will become a relic in New York State unless the legis-
lature retreats from its current position.").
'4 Id. at 627.
" See generally Brewer & Smith, supra note 14; Sluzar, supra note 27.
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the executive branch, and several complex and controversial
issues related to the budget. It is worth noting that the OML
does not constrain discussions between the executive and his
or her cabinet or commissioners. For better or worse, the law
applies, per se, to a local legislature, but not to the local execu-
tive.66
The OML, with all its flaws and loopholes, dictates the
activities of local public bodies. Yet, its application to local
governments is not necessarily a neat fit. As evidenced by the
State Legislature's swift and decisive action in 1985 ensuring
the broad availability of the political caucus exemption, the
OML was designed and revised most clearly within a state
context. One commentator contends that underlying the caucus
exemption is the assumption that an active, significant two-
party system exists, in which legislative representatives from
both parties are sufficient in relative size and power to com-
pete for political advantage.67 Such two- (or multi-) party sys-
tems typically do not exist at the local municipal level. Lacking
such a strong partisan political paradigm, applying the OML's
political caucus exemption within a local context is akin to
attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole. The frustration
with the behavior of some local public bodies, as manifested by
the judicial actions taken in Humphrey and Buffalo News, can
be attributed, in part, to this gap between the scope of the
state law and the nature and practice of local governments.
Of course, many observers of the state legislature's opera-
c Of course, commissions or task forces established by a municipality's execu-
tive, as well as other entities, may fall within the OML's definition of "public
body," but the executive's actions and deliberations with his/her executive staff are
not subject to the OML. The OML defines "public body" as:
any entity, for which a quorum is required in order to conduct public
business and which consists of two or more members, performing a gov-
ernmental function for the state or for an agency or department thereof,
or for a public corporation as defined in section sixty-six of the general
construction law, or committee or subcommittee or other similar body of
such public body.
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 102(2).
" See, e.g., Sluzar, supra note 27, at 627 ("The structure and size of the state
legislature tend to prevent elected officials from excluding the public from all dis-
cussions of public business .... This stable two-party structure, with a powerful
minority party, protects the public's right to information.") To illustrate, as of Au-
gust 1994, there were 35 Republicans and 26 Democrats in the State Senate. The
Assembly was comprised of 100 Democrats and 50 Republicans.
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tions would contend that the existence of two relatively equal
party delegations does not guarantee that a government body's
deliberations will occur in open, public forums. The regular use
of the political caucus exemption by the majority parties in the
State Senate and Assembly to determine the fate of legislative
items is an accepted fact of political life in Albany. Despite
criticism from the media, good government advocates and some
minority party legislators, the majorities in both houses have
steadfastly resisted any pressure to limit their use of the ex-
emption.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
During every state legislative session since 1983 legisla-
tion has been proposed that would amend the caucus provi-
sions of the OML.68 In 1994, each house introduced a separate
bill designed to reform the statutory framework of the exemp-
tion, yet neither was adopted.69
The proposed Senate bill, sponsored by Democratic Sena-
tor Nancy Larraine Hoffman of Syracuse and twelve other
Democrats, would have limited political committees, caucuses
and conferences to discussions of "partisan political matters"
only.70 Under this bill, party meetings that discuss "public
business" would be subject to the provisions of the OML. As
the prime sponsor's memorandum in support of the bill explic-
itly stated, the bill's intent was to "repeal the provision of the
1985 law permitting closed meetings and open the decision-
making process up to public scrutiny both at the state and
local level."" The New York Public Interest Research Group
' The New York Times commented in a recent editorial, "Bills to beef up the
meetings law have been kicking around Albany for years. It is time the Legisla-
ture made it easier for citizens to make the law work to their advantage." Beef
Up the Open Meetings Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at 22.
69 N.Y.S. 3509, N.YA. 12281, 214th Sess. (1994). Although it did not directly
address the political caucus exemption, another piece of legislation was introduced
in 1994 that would have subjected members of any state or local public body that
intentionally met in violation of the OMv1L to personal liability of fines of up to
$100. N.Y.A. 2446, 214th Sess. (1994). According to a memorandum in support of
the legislation, it was proposed as "an attempt to discourage any public body from
conducting meetings required to be open in a covert fashion." Memorandum in
Support of N.Y.A. 2446, *2 (Feb. 1, 1993).
To N.Y.S. 3509, 214th Sess. (1994).
,' Memorandum in support of N.Y.S. 12281 (July 11, 1994).
[Vol. 60: 1483
NEW YORKS OPEN MEETINGS LAW
("NYPIRG"), a non-profit government watchdog group, issued a
statement in support of an identical bill introduced by Senator
Hoffman in the 1992 legislative session. The group observed
that caucuses are "where crucial decisions about the future of
New York State are often made" and are "commonly used as a
method to shut the public out of important, fast-breaking deci-
sions."72 A 1992 editorial in The Buffalo News endorsed this
bill, stating that
[w]hen lawmakers are discussing the policy their party bloc or their
members will take on legislation, they are doing the public's busi-
ness. Hiding behind the excuse that these are party discussions
won't work.... No matter how the Albany establishment resists
this recommended change, it is scarcely a radical new idea....
Senator Hoffman's bill, which she would also apply to local govern-
ment, merely responds to the ideals of a democratic society governed
by elected representatives."
Such external support notwithstanding, the proposed legis-
lation would have profoundly restricted the Legislature's activ-
ities. It is not surprising therefore that the bill received little
institutional backing. The bill was referred to the Senate's
Committee on Investigations, Taxation and Government Oper-
ations, and became the subject of a "motion to discharge" by its
sponsor on March 30, 1994.7 The motion, if adopted, would
have allowed the bill to be discharged from the committee
without an affirmative vote and to be placed before the full
Senate. The motion was defeated, however, in a strictly parti-
san vote without any discussion by the Republican majority
72 Memorandum of New York Public Interest Research Group in Support of
N.Y.S. 3086 and N.Y.S. 7016.
' Open Up Albany Back Rooms and Let People See Process, BUFFALO NEWS,
Apr. 13, 1992, at C2.
"' A motion to discharge is a procedural motion to bring a bill to the floor for
debate without the favorable vote of a committee. If the motion is approved by a
majority of the members of the body, an affirmative vote of the standing commit-
tee is not required on the bill prior to consideration of the item by the full house.
See N.Y. SEN. R. XXI, § 1.
According to Senator Hoffman's staff, her motion was defeated without com-
ment after the Senate's Republican acting majority leader called a "party vote in
the negative," which was adhered to by the entire Republican delegation. An edito-
rial published by the Rochester Times Union after the Senate's rejection of the
motion to discharge this bill in 1992 criticized the use of "party line" votes be-
cause Senators were not required to vote by name. Democracy? No Way, Not in
Albany, ROCHESTER TIMEs UNION, May 20, 1992 ("Party line votes mean that no
one is accountable, and nothing changes.").
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members. It was the third consecutive year that Senator
Hoffinan's motion to discharge the bill from committee was
defeated.
A similar bill was introduced in the Assembly late in the
1994 legislative session that would have limited state and local
legislative caucuses to discussions of "matters of political party
business, including the development of political party policy on
issues of public business."7" In an attempt to strike a more
accommodating position, the Democratic sponsors' memoran-
dum in support noted that "[wihile it is important to the legis-
lative process for members of a political conference to conduct
party business and develop party policy in private, it is essen-
tial when they cross the line to conduct public business that
the public be involved and aware of their deliberations." 6 The
practical distinction between developing party policy on issues
of public business and actually making a partisan decision on
those issues is so unclear that it likely would have been con-
strued broadly by governmental bodies and consequently chal-
lenged in the courts. Nevertheless, the bill died without consid-
eration in the Assembly's Democrat-controlled Governmental
Operations Committee.77
The fate of these legislative proposals is hardly surprising.
Hopes for the direct repeal or restriction of the 1985 Amend-
ment, insofar as it applies to the State Legislature, appear
marginal. Considering the expansive amendatory language
added in 1985, any encroachment on legislative operations in
Albany is likely to receive the same negative treatment as the
two bills introduced in 1994. The intransigence of both parties
in the State Legislature on this issue, may result in legislative
action that shifts the focus of statutory reform to the local
context. While legislative proposals restricting the use of cau-
cuses by local governmental bodies and exempting the State
Legislature may face enhanced prospects of passage in Albany,
they do so only at the expense of the local autonomy underly-
ing municipal home rule. This increasingly likely scenario,
raises significant questions regarding the institutional relation-
' N.YA. 12281, 214th Sess. (1994).
' Memorandum in Support of N.Y.A. 12281, at *2 (July 11, 1994).
" As of August 1994, the committee was chaired by a Democrat, and was com-
prised of seven other Democrats and two Republicans.
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ship between state and local government in New York.
V. POSSIBLE STATE REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CAUCUSES
Opponents of the caucus exemption's current scope now
must wrestle with finding feasible statutory solutions to per-
ceived abuses while conceding that the State Legislature is not
going to adversely affect its own operations by reversing the
1985 law. One alternative is to seek legislative reform of the
manner in which the exemption applies to local government."
In fact, Governor Cuomo proffered such a proposal in a bill he
submitted for consideration in 1993."9 The bill, proposed as
the Governor's 'Trogram Bill Number 117" of 1993, was never
actually introduced by either house and, therefore, was not
considered seriously. Nevertheless, this proposal presents a
possible compromise that could be struck among the Governor
and the majority leaders in the Senate and Assembly, albeit to
the exclusion of municipal input or agreement.
The former Governor's proposed legislation would have
added a new section 105-a to the OML. This clause would
regulate the conduct of caucuses of party members of a "uni-
cameral legislative body," thus explicitly excluding the bicam-
eral State Legislature. Essentially, the bill would have limited
the availability of closed caucuses to any political party delega-
tion that constituted less than fifty-one percent of the legisla-
71 In his 1986 article, Sluzar proposed an amendment "allowing state legislative
caucuses to discuss any matter in private, yet restricting such discussion for local
legislative caucuses to political business" because "the structure and composition of
the state legislature tend to minimize the adverse effects of the statute." Sluzar,
supra note 27, at 629. This proposition, however, ignores the fact that all substan-
tive deliberations and decisions of voting majorities in each house on the state
level would remain closed to the public. Further, even if one were to overcome the
fundamental issue of whether the State Legislature is acting in a manner consis-
tent with the intent of the OML, reliance upon its composition as a mitigating
factor is tenuous given the obvious potential for electoral change in party repre-
sentation.
"' Governor's Program Bill No. 117 (1993). A substantially identical program
bill was introduced in 1988 but failed to make it out of committee. See N.Y.A.
8936, 211th Sess. (1988). Similar legislation also was introduced, both independent-
ly and at the request of Governor Cuomo, in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Although the
Governor's program bill was not introduced in either 1993 or 1994, in each year
the Governor's annual message to the State Legislature included brief references
to this proposed reform.
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tive body's total membership."0 The legislation also provided
that this composition threshold could be increased by a local
legislative body acting by local law to allow closed caucuses for
political party delegations that constituted no more than two-
thirds of the body's total membership.8 The proposed legisla-
tion further provided that closed caucuses would only be al-
lowed "for the purpose of discussing political party strategy or
political party position with respect to the responsibility, au-
thority, powers or duty of the legislature." 2 Finally, the legis-
lation would have required the party to announce publicly
meeting times pursuant to section 104 of the ONLV3
According to the former Governor's memorandum in sup-
port, this bill attempted to address the fact that
[iun the case of unicameral legislative bodies dominated by a single
political party, a political majority potentially has the ability to
engage in the entire deliberative process in private. The only action
required to be public in that circumstance is a public vote affirming
a decision essentially made in private.'
By allowing local legislative bodies to increase the maximum
party composition from one-half to two-thirds, the memoran-
dum asserted that the bill "gives effect to principles of home
rule." 5 The requirement that such increase in the party com-
position threshold be effected by local law "would allow for
public debate as to whether a majority party could validly
' Governor's Program Bill No. 117, at 1.
81 Id.
' Id. The New York Times recently endorsed this proposal, stating that it
"would bring party caucuses under the law when those gatherings amount to a
dress rehearsal for an open meeting rather than a purely intramural strategy ses-
sion." Beef Up the Open Meetings Law, supra note 68, at 22. Although this pro-
posed language appears markedly different than the current provision, its actual
impact is doubtful. As Sluzar noted with respect to this language when initially
proposed in 1986, "[tlhis is the equivalent of allowing a political caucus to discuss
public business in private." Sluzar, supra note 27, at 633. The broad language
proposed likely would serve as a large tent under which much of the closed-door
activity that the bill apparently seeks to proscribe would be allowed.
' Id. Other provisions of the proposed legislation would have authorized courts
to impose up to a $500 fine on any individual member of a public body who in-
tentionally violated any provision of the OML and to invalidate any action taken
by a public body when that action, or "substantial deliberations" relating to it, was
taken in violation of the OML. See id.
Governors Program Bill No. 117, supra note 80, at 1.
Governor's Program Bill No. 117, supra note 80, at 1.
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conduct closed caucuses when discussing public business.""
The legislative proposal is seriously flawed in several
respects. First, the bill's focus on local legislative bodies begs
the retort, "State government, heal thyself." The bill hypocrit-
ically excludes the State Legislature from the open meeting
provisions it advocates for local governments. There are two
possible explanations for the bill's exemption for the State
Legislature. Either the caucus exemption is used appropriately
by the State Legislature consistent with the original intent and
the Governor's interpretation of the OML, or, despite the
Senate's and Assembly's apparent circumvention of the OML
through the use of party conferences, the only reform that
would have any possibility of passage is one that deflects the
focus from state government to local government. Given the
widespread opinion of observers within and without govern-
ment circles that the caucus exemption is used improperly, the
latter rationale is most likely.
If the intent of the OML is to ensure that "the public busi-
ness be performed in an open and public manner and that the
citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the
performance of public officials and attend and listen to the
deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public
policy,"87 then an analysis of the effect of the caucus exemp-
tion must be based upon whether state conferences prevent the
public from observing, attending or listening to the
legislature's deliberations and decisions on public policy. If this
threshold question is answered in the affirmative, the next
consideration must be whether the purposes .and practical
applications of those caucuses satisfy other governmental con-
cerns and merit the continued exemption from the OML's pro-
visions. The primary arguments offered to justify differential
treatment of State Legislature caucuses as compared with local
legislative bodies inappropriately deviate from this straight-
forward analysis.
The contention that more equal party representation in
the State Legislature serves as a check on closed caucuses and
therefore provides a reason to exempt the State from reform,
fails. Deliberations and decisions are being made in private by
' Governor's Program Bill No. 117, supra note 80, at 1.
87 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100.
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voting majorities in each house. The reality is that whatever
decisions are reached in the Republican party conference in the
Senate or in the Democratic party conference in the Assembly
become the final decisions of their respective bodies. Minority
party protestations have slight, if any, effect. A recent analysis
of the declining condition of New York State challenged this
reality and issued the following appraisal of government in
Albany:
New York politics is a duopoly, a bipartisan condominium in re-
straint of competition and accountability... Democrats have con-
trolled the Assembly for 20 years and, with the exception of one
session, Republicans have controlled the Senate since the 1920s.
There is little or no debate in Albany, where the governor and the
majority leaders make policy for everyone else. A few mavericks
such as Sen. Nancy Larraine Hoffinan from Syracuse-part of the
chamber's permanent Democratic minority-have bucked the tide,
but at a high price. She has been shunned by her own party and
targeted by the Republicans.'
Thus, upon closer examination, the assertion that Albany's
two-party system mitigates against what proponents of reform
assert would otherwise be abuses of the caucus exemption is
not convincing.
Similarly, the notion that the State Legislature's size,
party representation or media exposure make it more likely
that discussions held in party conferences in Albany will be
conveyed to the public through the media simply lacks mer-
it. 9 The intent of the OML is not satisfied simply because
some second-hand or paraphrased excerpts of those discussions
are publicly available. As the legislative declaration n section
100 makes clear, it is not access to adulterated information
that the OML guarantees, but rather actual, physical, contem-
poraneous proximity to the deliberations and discussions of
public business. If the Senate and Assembly are denying such
' Fred Siegel & Bruce Bender, The Decline of the Empire State: Rockefeller,
Cuomo and the "New York Idea", NEW DEMoCRAT, Nov. 1994, at 13.
' "A reporter in Albany may get direct quotes from legislators as to what
happened in caucus meetings; the reporter on the local beat has a lesser chance of
such cooperation." Sluzar, supra note 27, at 628 n.107. But see id. at 633, wherein
Sluzar, rather than advocating for some form of public notice or disclosure of cau-
cus deliberations on a local level, insists that "the public needs to be inside those
doors. The Open Meetings Law should be amended in a manner that gives the
public substantive rights of access." Id. at 633 (emphases added).
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actual access through the use of closed party conferences, then
proponents of reform must include the State Legislature in any
reform measures.
Conferences in the State Legislature clearly serve as fo-
rums in which a political majority can engage in the entire
deliberative process in private. The bicameral structure of the
State Legislature does not effectively distinguish it from local
unicameral bodies, except insofar as a decision made by the
Senate Republican majority conference to support an item may
be countered by the opposing position taken by the Assembly
Democratic majority conference, or vice versa, thus precluding
the possibility of enactment into law. The fact remains that
both types of decisions are made by a voting majority in each
house during a private session away from public scrutiny. This
is the exact evil that the former Governor's proposed bill would
have addressed, except that it would have distinguished state
and local evils, or more precisely, bicameral and unicameral
legislative bodies."0 The bill fails because such a distinction is
unwarranted.
More significantly, the former Governor's bill represented
an assault on the integrity and autonomy of local governments,
despite its assertions to the contrary in the accompanying
memorandum. The doctrine of municipal home rule has had a
long, albeit rocky, history in New York State.9' Its latest in-
" It only can be assumed that the bill was an attempt to achieve what limit-
ed reform its proponents thought possible given the historical reluctance of the
State Legislature. Such is not the stuff of sound public policy nor responsible law-
making.
As an illustration of the extent to which the State Legislature was insulated
from the substantive provisions of this bill, both the limitation on the subject
matter that could be discussed in caucuses and the notice provisions, contained in
the new section 105-a, would have applied only to unicameral legislative bodies.
Therefore, while local legislative caucuses could only be closed upon notice when
discussing "political party strategy or [a] political party position with respect to
the responsibility, authority, powers or duties of the legislative body," the provi-
sions of section 108 still would apply to the State Legislature, which allows closed
caucuses regardless of "the subject matter under discussion, including the discus-
sion of public business," without any requirement of public notice.
" See, e.g., New York ex rel. Metropolitan Street Ry. v. State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 431-32, 67 N.E. 69, 70-71 (1903) ("The principle of home
rule, or the right of self-government as to local affairs, existed before we had a
constitution .... The liberties and customs of localities reappear on a novel and
wider basis in the town meetings of New England and the various colonies, includ-
ing the colony of New York."), affd, 199 U.S. 1 (1905); see also James D. Cole,
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carnation, is comprised of three tiers of constitutional and
statutory assertions of and restrictions on the governmental
autonomy of municipalities. 2 Article IX of the State Constitu-
tion sets forth the basic "bill of rights" for local governments. It
limits the State Legislature's power to act in relation to the
"property, affairs or government" of any local government ex-
Constitutional Home Rule in New York: "The Ghost of Home Rule" 59 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 713 (1985).
In New York, home rule was an outgrowth of the nineteenth century
political struggle between New York City, dominated by one political
party, and the rural areas of the state, dominated by another political
party.. . Despite the efforts of such mid-nineteenth century home rule
advocates as Governor Tilden, the state legislators of rural areas in New
York were able to prevent a home rule amendment to the constitution
until 1894. The 1894 amendment to the state constitution (Article XII,
§2) provided the first constitutional basis of home rule in New York.
Subsequent legislatures have continued to enact home rule statutes and
constitutional amendments. In New York, home rule retains considerable
support in the legislature but has consistently been restricted by the
judiciary.
Id. at 714 n.4. Addressing the effect of this pattern of judicial decisions, Cole
concluded:
The recent trend toward a more precipitous contraction of home rule
powers is crumbling the foundation of effective home rule in New York.
The balance between state and local powers has tipped away from the
preservation of local authority toward the presumption of state concern.
The foundation, "property, affairs or government," has come to embody
"the ghost of home rule."
Id. at 715. More recently, Judge Hancock of the New York Court of Appeals cited
Cole's article in his dissent from the Court's opinion upholding the enactment of a
1990 law without a home-rule message, which prescribed a procedure for deter-
mining Staten Islanders' interest in secession from New York City. City of New
York v. State, 76 N.Y.2d 479, 491, 562 N.E.2d 118, 124, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154, 160
(1990) (Hancock, J., dissenting). According to Judge Hancock, the majority opinion
"gives unwelcome credence to the gloom expressed by one commentator for the
future of home rule in New York." Id.
' See N.Y. CONST. art. 9 (establishing the constitutional framework of munici-
pal home rule); N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW (McKinney 1988) (expands upon the
constitutional grant and details specific powers granted to, and limitations on,
cities, counties, villages and towns); N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOVTrS (McKinney 1988)
(grants certain home-rule powers and establishes a mechanism whereby such pow-
ers cannot be restricted except by an enactment made in two successive legislative
sessions). In his 1963 approval message of the Municipal Home Rule Law, Gov-
ernor Rockefeller stated that "[tihe proposed constitutional amendment and imple-
menting legislation represent another important step in the efforts of my Adminis-
tration to strengthen the governments closest to the people so that they may help
meet the present and emerging needs of our time." Governor's Memorandum on
Approval of Ch. 843 N.Y. Laws (1963), reprinted in Ch. 843 [1967] N.Y. LAWS xxvi
(Mcdinney).
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cept by general law, or by special law upon the request of the
local legislative body (known as a "home rule message"). 93 Ar-
ticle IX also prescribes the parameters of local legislative au-
thority. It authorizes local governments to adopt and amend
local laws so long as they are consistent with the provisions of
the State Constitution, or relate to municipal property, affairs
or government, and other general laws regarding specifically
enumerated subjects, including "the transaction of its busi-
ness."94 These same powers are reiterated and specifically ap-
plied to all counties, cities, towns and villages in section 10 of
the Municipal Home Rule Law, the statutory enactment that
followed the approval of the new constitutional provisions in
1963.9"
In summary, home rule encompasses a complex interplay
of state and local governmental authority. It is an affirmative
grant of power to local governments to manage their own af-
fairs and a restriction on the state from intruding upon mat-
ters of local, rather than state, concern. Home rule also limits
the autonomy of local governments through the doctrines of
legislative inconsistency and preemption, and establishes the
specific parameters of local legislative authority.96
13 N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(b)(2) (the legislature "[s]hall have the power to act in
relation to the property, affairs or government of any local government only by
general law, or by special law only (a) on request of two-thirds of the total mem-
bership of its legislative body or on request of its chief executive officer concurred
in by a majority of such membership"); see also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 40
(allows local government to request enactment of laws relating to their property,
affairs or government).
94 N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(c)(3); see also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)
(gives local governments the power to adopt and amend local laws so long as they
are not inconsistent with the State Constitution or any general law relating to
courts property, affairs or government).
1963 N.Y. Laws 843 (codified at N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10).
'" A local law may be deemed invalid and superseded by state law based upon
a finding of either preemption or inconsistency, two related but distinct doctrines.
The overriding doctrine of preemption applies when the state has evidenced its
intention to occupy the entire field or subject matter to the exclusion of local law.
Such intention to preempt may be established by an express declaration by the
state or implied through the enactment of a comprehensive statutory scheme. In-
corporated Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 500, 505, 583
N.E.2d 928, 930, 577 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (1991). Where this state intention is
found, local regulations are preempted "regardless of whether their terms conflict
with provisions of the State statute or only duplicate them." Lansdown Entertain-
ment Corp. v. New York City Dep't of Consumer Aff., 74 N.Y.2d 761, 765, 543
N.E.2d 725, 727, 545 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1989).
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In 1976, when the OML was enacted, little consideration
was given to the effect its provisions would have on local gov-
ernments.97 Although the conduct of meetings of a local body
certainly seem to fit within the scope of the phrase "property,
affairs or government," the State Legislature declared it a
matter of state concern that the public exposure to governmen-
tal processes guaranteed in the OML be applied uniformly
throughout the state.9" Deliberations on the 1985 Amendment
prompted by the Sciolino decision and the subsequent advisory
opinion suggest an inattentiveness to application of the OML
to local governments. Instead the State Legislature appeared
preoccupied with staving off any further challenges to the
State Legislature's use of party conferences.99 Nevertheless,
In those instances where the state has not evinced an intent to preempt all
local legislation, inconsistency may be found if state and local laws directly con-
flict-for example if the state specifically permits conduct prohibited at the local
level, or conversely, the local law permits an act which has been prohibited by
state law. Lansdown Entertainment Corp., 74 N.Y.2d at 766-67, 543 N.E.2d at 728,
545 N.Y.S.2d at 85; see also Roth v. Cuevas, 158 Misc. 2d 238, 246-47, 603
N.Y.S.2d 962, 968 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd, 82 N.Y.2d 791, 624 N.E.2d 689,
604 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1993). A local law also may be deemed inconsistent if it impos-
es prerequisite additional restrictions on rights under state law, so as to inhibit
the operation of the state's general laws. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of
New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 217, 505 NE.2d 915, 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351
(1987), affd, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
The first comprehensive analysis of the OML, undertaken shortly after its
enactment, contained no discussion regarding possible distinct implications of the
OML on a local versus state level. See Brewer & Smith, supra note 14.
" Since Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929), courts universally
have accepted that municipal home rule protection is removed if the subject mat-
ter of state legislation concerns a matter of overriding state concern. In his con-
curring opinion in Adler, Judge Cardozo articulated the standard that has been
used ever since: "[11f the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State
concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are concerns of the
locality." 251 N.Y. at 491, 167 N.E. at 714 (Cardozo, J., concurring); see also
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 494, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393
N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (1977) ("Restated, the phrase 'property, affairs or government' of
a locality has not served to paralyze the State Legislature where to a substantial
degree, in depth or extent, a matter of State concern is involved."). Cole criticized
courts' commonplace finding of "substantial state concerns" to encroach upon mu-
nicipal home rule, commenting that in Adler "the roots of home rule had barely
taken hold when the state's highest court established a rubric for the expansion of
state powers at the expense of local authority." Cole, supra note 91, at 714-15.
' See e.g., Sluzar, supra note 27, at 628-29.
Although the 1985 amendment has widespread effects throughout the
state, it is obvious that the sponsors of the bill were concerned most
with protecting the right to hold closed political caucuses in the New
York State Legislature. Prior to the vote on the amendment, two sena-
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the amendment clearly evinced the Legislature's intent that it
should apply to "legislative bodies," not simply to the State
Legislature and should serve to reverse the "ero[sion]" of the
exemption by "recent judicial decisions," not simply the restric-
tive interpretation advocated by the advisory opinion."0
The 1985 Amendment deliberations made no attempt to
distinguish the State Legislature from local legislatures. Fur-
thermore, the only substantive difference in a similar joint
Senate-Assembly bill introduced two days prior to the subse-
quently enacted bill was that the earlier bill explicitly defined
caucuses to mean only "a private meeting of members of the
senate or assembly of the state of New York."' All referenc-
es in the enacted bill to local legislative bodies were specifical-
ly omitted. The earlier version of the legislation, which pre-
sumably would have more accurately reflected the State
Legislature's desire to protect its own party conferences, was
never acted upon.
Moreover, the State Legislature's intent to establish a
statewide framework for ensuring that "public business be
performed in an open and public manner" is evidenced by its
explicit declaration, in section 110, that the OML supersedes
any local law, ordinance or regulation that is more restrictive
of public access."' In other words, the state, by statute, ex-
tors, majority leader Warren Anderson and minority leader Manfred
Ohrenstein, spoke in favor of the bill. Both senators failed, however, to
discuss the impact of this bill on local government. Instead, they focused
their comments on the state legislature.
Id.
100 Ch. 136, § 1 [1985] N.Y. LAWS 1.
101 N.Y.S. 6252, N.Y.A. 7792, 210th Sess. (1985); see also Sluzar, supra note 27,
at 629 n.114 (the joint bill did not apply to local political caucuses).
102 Section 110 of the Public Officers Law, entitled "Construction with Other
Laws," reads as follows:
1. Any provision of a charter, administrative code, local law, ordi-
nance, or rule or regulation affecting a public body which is more restric-
tive with respect to public access than this article shall be deemed super-
seded hereby to the extent that such provision is more restrictive than
this article.
2. Any provision of general, special or local law or charter, admin-
istrative code, ordinance, or rule or regulation less restrictive with re-
spect to public access than this article shall not be deemed superseded
hereby.
3. Notwithstanding any provision of this article to the contrary, a
public body may adopt provisions less restrictive with respect to public
access than this article.
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pressly deemed inconsistent any local enactment that did not
at a minimum provide the degree of openness prescribed in the
OML. Pursuant to this provision, any such local regulation
would be deemed void to the extent that it was more restric-
tive.
Conversely, and of critical importance, section 110 also
accords local governments a certain measure of autonomy in
providing for greater public exposure to the political process.
Section 110, subdivision 2, explicitly permits local governments
to maintain pre-existing laws or regulations and adopt new
such provisions so long as they facilitate greater public access
than the OML provides. In other words, local governments are
expressly delegated the authority to spread more "sunshine" on
their political processes. °3 This local authority can be exer-
cised without limitation even to specifically limit the political
caucus exemption as determined by the local governmental
body.
Though virtually ignored by some commentators on the
OML, this provision should serve to shift the reformers' focus
from judicial attempts to re-write the OML-such as
Humphrey and Buffalo News-and from amendatory state
legislation that exempts the State Legislature. The advocates'
appropriate alternative, contemplated under the existing stat-
ute and properly respectful of the home rule authority of mu-
nicipalities, is to engage in efforts to convince local govern-
ments to adopt ordinances or regulations that increase public
access by restricting their use of the political caucus exemp-
tion. This exact scenario occurred in the City of Ithaca in 1985.
The Ithaca city council enacted an ordinance adopting the
OML while amending the local provision regarding the caucus
exemption to read as follows: "notwithstanding any state law
to the contrary this exemption is to be narrowly, not expan-
sively construed; it shall apply solely to those meetings at
which only political and not public business is discussed.""°4
"0' For example, the New York City Charter provides that an executive session
may be convened by the City Council, its committees or certain listed commissions
and boards by a three-fourths vote of all its members to do so, rather than the
majority vote required by § 105 of the OML. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1060(b).
'"4 This example was cited by Sluzar in a footnote to show that "[a]fter the
Open Meetings Law was amended, lobby groups began to pressure lawmakers for
repeal" and "[some municipalities responded to the political pressure by enacting
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This example illustrates how section 110 of the OML can and
should be utilized as it was intended to prohibit municipalities
from restricting open government while allowing them to re-
spond to local needs and interests by expanding public expo-
sure to local government.
Section 110 indicates that although the State Legislature
has established a statutory framework of statewide applica-
tion, it intended to defer to each local government the decision
whether to expand upon the statewide minimum in order to
accommodate the specific nature and context of local govern-
ment processes. The State Legislature could have sought to
preempt all local regulation on the subject of open meetings
either by expressly declaring so or by implication through
enacting a comprehensive, detailed legislative scheme. It did
not do so, presumably because of its desire to allow municipali-
ties to go beyond the state scheme and opt for greater public
access to the political process.
CONCLUSION
The OML's inherent flexibility in its application on the
local level should serve to redirect judicial efforts to legislate
and legislators' futile attempts to seek amendments to state
legislation toward public campaigns to convince local govern-
ments to increase public access to their activities by restricting
the political caucus exemption. At the very least, the potential
for negative exposure on a local level from concerted efforts by
the media and advocacy groups may serve to constrain local
legislatures from regularly or cavalierly convening political
caucuses to transact public business. Indeed, by including
section 110 in its statutory scheme, the State Legislature facil-
itated the exercise of the democratic process on the municipal
level. As with any public issue, advocates of local reform may
change the way their municipal legislatures conduct their
business by clearly articulating their concerns, gaining active
media support and employing aggressive, sustained lobbying
their own resolutions pertaining to open meetings." Sluzar, supra, note 27, at 631
n.118. In that same footnote, the author included a one-sentence reference to the
local authority granted under N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 110(3), the only mention of
this section in the entire article.
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efforts.
Of course, a strong argument can be made that unlimited
or expansive openness is not necessarily good for the institu-
tional political process. It can hinder the institutional checks
between legislative and executive branches and hamper frank
discussions of sensitive or complex matters that would be coun-
terproductive if engaged in publicly. Yet such a conclusion, or
its converse, must be reached or rejected based upon the delib-
erations of the local body politic, and should not be imposed by
other institutions of government. The judicial attempts in
Humphrey and Buffalo News to re-write the OML ultimately
trespassed upon the territory of the State Legislature, as well
as local legislative bodies, and improperly articulated non-exis-
tent amendments to the OML. Similarly, state legislative ef-
forts that would restrict the exemption only for local legislative
bodies at best represent an incomplete and flawed legislative
exercise and at worst are a utilitarian calculation that sacrific-
es an intellectually consistent reform movement for political
expediency. Regardless of motivation, such an amendment
would inappropriately impinge upon the municipal autonomy,
however tenuous in practice, that has been constitutionally
ingrained in state-local governmental relations in New York
State and evidenced by the explicit seventeen-year statutory
grant of local authority in the OML.
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